Greenhouse Development Rights: A Proposal for a Fair Global Climate Treaty, differs in at least four ways from other academic treatments of GDRs. First, it is written almost entirely by Paul Baer, rather than by the “GDRs author’s group.” Second, it goes beyond the standard exposition of GDRs to situate it philosophically, and to speculate about its philosophical and political implications. Third, it focuses on our attempt the ground specific, and pragmatically critical quantitative choices — e.g. the value of the “development threshold” — on ethical judgments. And, forth, it is accompanied by a number of responses, which variously support it and take it to task.
An example:
“Henry Shue (1999) reviews common-sense ethical considerations that apply to the problem of burden sharing, and argues that it is relatively uncontroversial that ‘the wealthier should pay more for public goods’ and ‘the responsible should pay to clean up their mess’. However, these principles are hardly sufficient to identify the appropriate quantification of obligations even in a fictional world of otherwise characterless consumers and polluters. Indeed, in the work of those like Shue who embrace a ‘the rich must go first’ approach (as opposed to an equal per capita allocations approach), the absence of any justification for an answer to ‘first, but by how much and for how long?’ appears as a notable lacuna.”
In general, this essay (which is unfortunately behind a paywall) is worth running down, particularly if you want an introduction to some of the philosophical problems associated with the GDRs approach, and a collection of opinions on the various quantitative / philosophical judgments that are embedded within the framework. E.g.: Why have we represented the development threshold in terms of income, rather than, say, in terms of the Human Development Index? And should the system be more “progressive?” And why do we begin our accounting of historical responsibility in 1990?
As for the responses, they are, by and large, useful, and tease out many of the subtleties that lie within seeming simple notions like “responsibility,” “capacity,” and “solidarity,” and “progressivity.” Many of them are interesting, and taken as a group, they offer up an excellent – and quick — tour of a philosophical territory that we’ll have to carefully explore if ever we want a really serious approach to the problem of global climate justice. Only one — “Contra Watermelons” by Walter Block (College of Business Administration, Loyola University New Orleans) — is actually stupid.
Cruel Mistress (the co-editor of Ethics, Place and Environment) has another comment on the exchange here. Her blog is interesting in general.
